GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Faculty Scholarship

2007

The Second National Risk and Culture Study: Making Sense of and Making Progress In - The American Culture War of Fact
Donald Braman
George Washington University Law School, dbraman@law.gwu.edu

Dan M. Kahan
Paul Slovic
John Gastil
Geoffrey L. Cohen

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Braman, Donald; Kahan, Dan M.; Slovic, Paul; Gastil, John; and Cohen, Geoffrey L., "The Second National
Risk and Culture Study: Making Sense of - and Making Progress In - The American Culture War of Fact"
(2007). GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works. 211.
https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications/211

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu.

The Second National Risk and Culture Study:
Making Sense of—and Progress in—the American
Culture War of Fact
Dan M. Kahan
Yale Law School

Donald Braman
George Washington Law School

John Gastil
University of Washington

Paul Slovic
Decision Research

Geoffrey Cohen
University of Colorado

Introduction
Is there a “culture war” in the United States? If so, what it is it about?
Political scientists tend to treat the “culture war” thesis as media hype. Polls, they point out,
consistently show that the vast majority of citizens rank societal welfare—economic prosperity,
national security, the quality of the environment, and the like—ahead of “moral values” when
asked to identify issues of political importance (Fiorina 2005).
At the same, time, what people believe government should do to promote societal welfare is
undeniably correlated with their cultural outlooks. Most citizens might be less concerned about
whether the government should ban flag burning than whether it should do something about
global warming; about whether state judges should be permitted to display the Ten Commandments in their courtrooms than whether workers should be afforded a higher minimum wage;
about whether men should be allowed to marry other men than about whether the U.S. should
send more men (and women) to Iraq. But it turns out that individuals’ positions on the former set
of so-called symbolic, cultural issues strongly predicts what they think about the latter set of material, non-cultural ones (Kahan & Braman 2006).
Most of us, in fact, are perfectly aware of this connection. When we reflect on controversial
policy positions—“the death penalty doesn’t deter murder”; “climate change is a natural, cyclical
phenomenon”; “gun control will reduce violent crime”; “the minimum wage will lead to unemployment and ultimately hurt the poor”—we don’t think of them as being merely right or wrong.
We also instantly recognize them as the sort of things “people like them” assert or deny; they are
beliefs that our close associates tend to have unified position on—the challenging of which could
actually cost us their friendship.
So even if the political scientists are right about what citizens really want, there still is a culture war in American politics. It’s not so much about whether law should reflect “our” values or
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“theirs” but about whose view of the facts—”ours” or “theirs”—societal welfare policies of various sorts should be based on.
Understanding this peculiar cultural war of facts and trying to assess what might be done to
broker peace in it are the motivating aims of the Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School.
This report describes the results of a series of surveys and experiments, conducted over a ninemonth period and involving some 5,000 Americans, that bear on these matters.

Cultural Cognition: Theory and Empirical Testing
The “cultural cognition thesis” asserts that people’s beliefs about risk are shaped by their
core values. Because of a combination of interrelated psychological dynamics, individuals conform their views about what sorts of activities endanger societal welfare, and what sorts of policies effectively combat those dangers, to their cultural evaluation of those activities (Kahan &
Braman 2006).
The theory of cultural cognition rests
on a parsimonious framework for classifyHierarchy
ing individuals’ cultural values. This
framework (patterned on Douglas, 1970)
characterizes “cultural worldviews,” or
preferences for how to organize society,
along two cross-cutting axes: “hierarchyIndividualist
Communitarian
Individual
egalitarianism” and “individualism-communitarianism.” People who subscribe to a
“hierarchical” worldview believe that
rights, duties, goods, and offices should be
distributed differentially and on the basis
Equality
of clearly defined and stable social characteristics (e.g., gender, wealth, lineage, ethEgalitarian
nicity). Those who subscribe to an “egalitarian” worldview believe that rights, duties, goods, and offices should be distributed equally and
without regard to such characteristics. People who subscribe to a “communitarian” worldview
believe that societal interests should take precedence over individual ones and that society should
bear the responsibility for securing the conditions of individual flourishing. Those who subscribe
to an “individualistic” worldview believe that individuals should secure the conditions of their
own flourishing without collective interference or assistance. 1
Hierarchist

Using this framework, researchers affiliated with the Cultural Cognition Project found in the
First National Risk and Culture Study (2004) that beliefs about societal risks are distributed
across persons in patterns consistent with the cultural cognition thesis (Kahan et al. 2007a). Ega-

1

Our studies measure individuals’ worldviews with two attitudinal scales (Kahan et al. 2007a). For ease of exposition, we refer to persons as either “egalitarians” or “hierarchs,” and either “individualists” or “communitarians,”
depending on where their worldview scores fall in relation to the average on the relevant scale. This framework, of
course, is only one representation of people’s cultural values; “worldviews” are more numerous, and more complex,
than this. The value of the parsimonious scheme we use, however, is that it makes it possible to characterize individual differences in a tractable way that enables relatively straightforward empirical testing of how values interact
with risk perceptions.
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litarians and communitarians, for example, worry about environmental risks (nuclear power accidents, global warming, air pollution, etc.), the abatement of which would justify regulating
commercial activities that generate inequality and legitimize the unconstrained pursuit of individual self-interest. Individualists, in contrast, reject claims of environmental risk precisely because they cherish markets and private orderings. They worry instead that excessive gun control
will render individuals unable to defend themselves—a belief congenial to the association of
guns with individualist virtues such as self-reliance, courage, and martial prowess. Hierarchs fret
about the societal risks of drug use and promiscuous sex, and the personal risks associated with
obtaining an abortion or smoking marijuana—forms of behavior that denigrate traditional social
norms and roles.
The Second National Risk and Culture Study was commenced in late December 2006 and
continued through early September 2007. During this time, researchers administered a series of
surveys and experiments to a nationally representative sample of some 5,000 persons, who participated in these studies through on-line testing facilities. 2
The Study had two aims. The first was to identify the discrete social and psychological mechanisms through which cultural worldviews shape individuals’ beliefs about risk and related
issues. The second was to determine what sorts of techniques for providing information might
counteract or neutralize cultural cognition. The aim of such techniques isn’t to promote the formation of any particular set of beliefs. Rather it is to enable citizens who agree that they should
not be using the law to impose one or another cultural group’s values on the others to avoid doing that unwittingly as they deliberate about what policies promote society’s material welfare.

Issues and Studies
1. Global Warming
Cultural Polarization Generally
The global warming debate turns a host of factual issues: Is the temperature of the earth really increasing? Are humans the cause of any such change in the earth’s temperature? Does climate change pose a threat to human health and prosperity? Beliefs on these facts, however, are
distributed in patterns that reflect citizens’ values. Replicating evidence from the First Study, the
Second found that cultural worldviews accurately predict who is global warming skeptic and
who a true believer: hierarchs and individualists tend to dismiss the claim that global warming is
occurring and is serious threat to our society, whereas egalitarians and communitarians take the
opposite view.

2

The nature of the sample and the study methods is discussed in greater detail in Appendix A.
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How much risk does global warming pose for people in our society?

Risk Perception

(% of Relevant Decile)

100%

69

62

54

45

41

31

27

21

15

11

100%

53

52

47

44

38

35

30

28

25

22

29
31

80%

80%

33
36

36

33

60%

60

34
33

25

33

26
13

37

39

42

29

20%

22
9

50

30

37

20%

0%

28

32

32

21

29

33
31

40%

34

32

60%

54
47

31

40%

33

High Risk
Moderate Risk
Slight or No Risk

19

15

more
. egalitarian
.
. <----------->
.
. more
. hierarchic
.

0%

18

21

24

more. communitarian
.
.
<------->
. more
.
. individualistic
.

Cultural Worldview: Population Deciles
(each bar 10% of U.S. Population)

Individuals’ worldviews, we
found, explained individuals’ beliefs
about global warming more powerfully than any other individual characteristic. How liberal or conservative people are, for example, explains less than one-third as much of
variance in such beliefs as how
egalitarian or hierarchical and how
communitarian or individualistic
they are. Whether one is a man or a
woman—a characteristic known to
influence environmental risk perceptions generally—explains than onetenth as much.

Global Warming Risk Perception Multivariate Regression Model
Female
.053***
Black
-.032
Other Minority
.107***
Age
.080***
Income
.001
Education
-.048**
Republican
-.118***
Independent
-.015
Conservative
-.106***
Trust in Govt
-.064***
Individualism
-.093***
Hierarchy
-.165***
R2
.26
N ≈ 1700. Semi-partial regression coefficients. Dependent variable:
GWRISK. *** p ≤ .01, ** p ≤ .05, * p ≤ .10.

Nuclear Power Makes Hierarchs and Individualists See Green
We also devoted considerable attention to figuring out precisely why culture exerts this effect, and whether anything might be done to counteract the resulting cultural polarization on
global warming beliefs. We conducted an experiment, the results of which show that the impact
of culture on the processing of factual information on climate change is highly conditional what
sort of policy people anticipate will be used to address it.
In the experiment, subjects were supplied with one of two versions of a newspaper article
reporting a study by a group of scientific experts. In both versions, the report was described as
finding that the temperature of the earth is increasing, that humans are the source of this condition, and that this change in the earth’s climate could have disastrous environmental economic
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consequences. In one, however, the scientific report was described as calling for “increased antipollution regulation,” whereas in another it was described as calling for “revitalization of the nation’s nuclear power industry.”

The results of the experiment showed that subjects receiving the “nuclear power” version of
the article were less culturally polarized than ones receiving the “anti-pollution” version. That is,
individualists and hierarchs who received the “nuclear power” version were less inclined to dismiss the facts related by the described report—that the earth’s temperature was increasing, that
humans were the cause, and that the consequences would be dire if global warming were not reversed—than were individualists and hierarchs who got the “antipollution” version, even though
the factual information, and its source, were the same in both articles. Indeed, individualists and
hierarchs who received the “antipollution” version of the news report were even more skeptical
about these facts than were hierarchs and individualists in a control group that received no newspaper story—and thus no information relating to the scientific report that made these findings.

We anticipated these results based on a dynamic known as “identity-protective” cognition
(Kahan et al. 2007a). As a way of avoiding dissonance and estrangement from valued groups,
individuals subconsciously resist factual information that threatens their defining values. This
defensive response can be reversed or mitigated when information is instead framed in a manner
that affirms those same commitments (Cohen et al. 2000; Cohen et al. in press).
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Hierarchs
Egalitarians

Communitarians
Individualists

Greater Risk

5.18***

p

Risk Perception

5.08***

5.06***

5.04***

4.90***

g

4.76*

4.54*

4.52***

4.32***

4.29***
4.22***
Smaller Risk

Control

4.30***

Antipol ution

Nuclear Power

Control

Anti polution

Nucl ea r Power

Experiment Condition
n ≈ 160 per condition. Global warming risk perception measured with 4-point scale *** p ≤ .01, ** p ≤ .05, * p ≤
.10 for differences in means across conditions.

The “anti-pollution” and “nuclear” versions framed the factual information in the report in a
“threatening” and “affirming” way, respectively, for individuals culturally predisposed to dismiss
global warming risks. Hierarchs and individualists tend to resist information on environmental
risks, the former because it seems to imply restriction of market activity and the latter because it
implicitly challenges governmental and business elites (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982; Kahan et al.
2007a). The demand for greater “anti-pollution controls” accentuates these connotations, and
thus increases the disposition of these persons to dismiss information relating to global warming.
Individualists and hierarchs, however, support nuclear power development, which is a symbol of
industrial markets, human mastery over nature, and the power and competence of scientific and
industrial elites. Accordingly, when they are told that increased investment in nuclear power is
the appropriate response to global warming, individuals with these orientations are less threatened. As a result they are more willing to accept the factual claims that suggest that global
warming is really a problem (Kahan et al. 2006).
2. Guns
Cultural Polarization Generally
The gun control debate features competing claims about risk. On the one hand, there’s the
concern of gun control supporters that too few restrictions on private gun ownership will lead to
accidents and violent crime. On the other, there’s the concern of gun control opponents who worry that too many restrictions will prevent law-abiding citizens from defending themselves (Kahan
& Braman 2003).
In the First National Risk and Culture Study, we found evidence that individuals’ cultural
outlooks determine which of these risks they take more seriously. Hierarchs tend to favorably
associate guns with hierarchical roles such as father, protector, and with respected hierarchical
institutions like the military; individualists favorably associate them with virtues like selfreliance and courage. Consistent with identity-protective cognition, persons with these values
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worry more about the risk of defenselessness. This is especially true for men who hold these cultural outlooks. Egalitarians, who associate guns with racial animus and sexism, and communitarians, who see private weapon ownership as symbols of distrust and lack of concern for others,
worry more about the risk of gun accidents and gun violence (Kahan et al. 2007a).

How much risk does private gun ownership pose for people in our
p
society?
Risk Perception

(% of Relevant Decile)

100%

35

30

24

80%

18

32

15

10

9

22

19

5
15

28
77

33

80

4
12

27

22

18

29

15

28

13
24

11
21

8

6

17

14
80

32

5
12
84

High Risk
Moderate Risk
Slight or No Risk

75

32
36

67

34

31

84

72

35

60%

7
16

68
63

57

53

50

40%

57

47

43

41

36

33

31

20%

0%

more
. egalitarian
.
. <----------->
.
. more
. hierarchic
.

more. communitarian
.
.
<------->
. more
.
. individualistic
.

Cultural Worldview: Population Deciles
(each bar 10% of U.S. Population)

In the Second National Risk and Culture Study, we found these patterns persist. People still
divide over the risks of gun ownership based on their cultural orientations, which in fact exert
considerably more influence than do
Gun-Risk Perception Multivariate Regression Model
other sorts of factors (thirteen times Female
.136***
as much as ideology, four times as Black
.094***
much as race, and two times as Other Minority
.108***
much as gender, for example).
Age
.029
Post- Virginia Tech

Income
Education
Republican
Independent
Conservative
Trust in Govt
Individualism
Hierarchy
R2

.014
-.013
-.073***
.007
-.055***
.077***
-.142***
-.136***
.25

The terrible shooting massacre
that killed 32 students at Virginia
Tech occurred during the course of
our study. Predictably, gun control
proponents cited the incident as evidence of the need for greater restrictions on firearms (Brady Campaign N ≈ 1800. Semi-partial regression coefficients. Dependent variable is
2007), while opponents countered GUNOWN. *** p ≤ .01, ** p ≤ .05, * p ≤ .10.
that existing firearms restrictions on school and university campuses had disarmed students who
might have cut the tragic attack short (Lott 2007).
We conducted a 1,500-person national survey after the incident to see whether individuals’
cultural worldviews influence which position they take on this question. We found that, indeed,
members of the American public are culturally divided on the effect of regulation guns on school
campuses, too. Communitarians (66%) and egalitarians (68%) predominantly reject the claim
that “strict gun control laws make it harder for potential victims of shootings at schools and uni-
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versities to protect themselves”; not so for Hierarchs and Individualists, majorities of whom
(59% and 56%, respectively) reject the notion that “stricter gun control laws would on the whole
increase safety of students at schools and universities.”
“Strict gun control laws make it
harder for potential victims of shootings at schools and universities to protect themselves.”
U.S. Population
Hierarchs
Egalitarians
Communitarians
Individualists

Agree
41%
49%
31%
33%
48%

Disagree
58%
50%
68%
66%
51%

“Stricter gun control laws
would on the whole increase
safety of students at schools
and universities.”
Agree
54%
41%
68%
64%
44%

Disagree
46%
59%
31%
35%
56%

N = 1,520. Margin of error ≈ +/- 2.5%

We also found that in the wake of the incident, the breakdown of Americans who support
and oppose stricter gun regulation was essentially unchanged from what it had been when we
conducted our initial National Risk and Culture Study some three years ago. This finding is consistent with ones that showed no movement in public opinion on gun control after the Columbine
massacre in 1999 (Smith 2000). One reason this might be so is that individuals of opposing cultural persuasions draw exactly the opposite conclusions from such an event (Kahan & Braman
2003). Our findings of cultural polarization on the impact of gun regulation on school and university campuses supports this hypothesis.

Persistence of Cultural Polarization on Gun Control After
Virginia Tech
“I favor stronger gun control laws.”

U.S. Population
Hierarchs
Egalitarians
Communitarians
Individualists

Agree
61%
48%
78%
73%
52%

2004
Disagree
39%
54%
22%
27%
48%

Agree
59%
46%
74%
72%
48%

July 2007
Disagree
40%
54%
25%
28%
52%

N = 1,520. Margin of error ≈ +/- 2.5%

3. Nanotechnology
The asserted risks of climate change and gun ownership are familiar. So is the cultural complexion of public disputes surrounding these assertions.
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The risks surrounding nanotechnology, however, are not at all familiar and have not, as of
yet, generated significant public dispute, cultural or otherwise. The Cultural Cognition Project, in
collaboration with the Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, designed a study of nanotechnology risk perceptions to assess how
cultural cognition influences the formation of attitudes toward novel risks (Kahan et al. 2007b).
In particular, that study was designed to assess whether cultural worldviews influence the
processing of risk information. Biased assimilation refers to the disposition of persons to notice
and credit evidence in a selective fashion that affirms their predispositions. When this dynamic is
at work, individuals of diverse values don’t converge but instead polarize when exposed to a
common body of information on some disputed factual issue (Lord et al. 1979).
We divided a diverse sample of 1,800 individuals into two groups. Because we anticipated
that the vast majority (as it turned out, some 80%) would not have previously heard very much
about nanotechnology, we supplied members of both groups with a brief description of what
nanotechnology is (“a relatively new form of science that involves the ability to measure, see,
predict and make things on the extremely small scale of atoms and molecules”). One set of subjects (the “no information” group) was furnished with no additional information, while the other
(the “information-exposed group”) was instructed to read two paragraphs that presented balanced
information on the potential risks and benefits of nanotechnology. Members of both groups were
then asked to indicate their beliefs about the relative size of these risks and benefits.
Comparisons of their
Mean Nanotechnology Risk Perception
responses showed that information polarized subjects
No Information
Information Exposed
along cultural lines. In the Hierarchs
2.64
2.72*
“no information” group, Egalitarians
2.67
2.58*
2.62
2.73**
there were no significant dif- Individualists
2.70
2.54**
ferences in beliefs among Communitarians
N
≈
1,800.
Risk
perception
is
risk
vs.
benefit
measured
on
a
four-point
scale .
hierarchs and egalitarians or
* denotes differences in differences of means of opposing groups across conamong individualists and
ditions significant at p ≤ .10, ** significant at p ≤ .05.
communitarians. But in the
“information-exposed group,” egalitarians and communitarians were significantly more concerned with the risks of nanotechnology relative to its benefits than were hierarchs and individualists. The subjects, in sum, had assimilated the information in a biased fashion that reflected
their cultural predispositions toward environmental risks (like global warming and nuclear
power) generally.
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This study, then,
generated
two
Communitarians
important conclusions.
One
Egalitarians
was that cultural
worldviews play
a critical role in
determining not
just how individuals
assess
information
Hierarchs
Individualists
about
familiar
and already controversial risks
but
unfamiliar
and as-yet unLower Risk
politicized risks
as well. Another
No Information
Information
Experiment Condition
was
that
nanotechnology might well emerge as another culturally divisive risk issue as the public learns
more and more about it.
Nanotechnology Risk Perception

Higher Risk

4.

Mandatory HPV Vaccination

The FDA recently approved a vaccine that would inoculate girls and women against infection by the human papillomavirus (HPV). HPV infection is sexually transmitted disease and is
the leading cause of cervical cancer. The CDC recommends vaccination at a relatively young age
(11-12), before the onset of sexual activity that can lead to HPV exposure and infection (at which
point the vaccine is ineffective). A political debate has started to emerge over whether government (through public schools or other agencies) should mandate HPV vaccination for all young
girls.
The HPV-vaccine debate—like the gun debate—features competing risk claims. Proponents
argue that the failure to administer mass vaccinations will lead to continuing widespread infection and correspondingly high rates of cervical cancer. Opponents argue that the vaccination, by
eliminating the risk of one common STD, might induce young women to engage in unprotected
sex and thus increase their risk of contracting other diseases, including HIV-AIDS. They also
raise concerns about potential unforeseen side effects from the vaccination (Gibbs 2006).
Moreover, the policy of mandatory HPV vaccination seems to touch on a variety of issues of
cultural import: from premarital sex to parental autonomy, from individual choice to the power
of the state to control medical decisions. One might expect, then, that individuals will resolve
competing factual claims about the risks of HPV in a manner that affirms rather than threatens
their cultural worldviews.
At the same time, the risks associated with HPV—like those associated with nanotechnology—are relatively novel. As a result, many members of the public are unlikely to have an intuitive or emotional response to the issue informed by their cultural affiliations. For that reason, the
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advent of the HPV vaccination debate supplies another opportunity to investigate the discrete
mechanisms through which culture operates to shape risk perceptions on new issues.
Biased Assimilation and Polarization
To that end, we constructed a multi-part experimental study. The first had the same aim as
our nanotechnology study: to determine whether individuals’ cultural predispositions biases how
they process information on a relatively novel risk. We divided 500 subjects into two groups: one
that received no information about the policy of mandatory vaccination of school-age girls other
than it was being proposed (the “no argument” group); and another that was instructed to read
opposing arguments relating to the policy (“argument” group). Both groups of subjects were
asked to indicate their beliefs about various facts relating to the policy (including its asserted
benefits in reducing the incidence of cervical cancer, its possible unanticipated side-effects, and
its contribution to the propensity of vaccinated females to have unprotected sex).
We again found that
Mean HPV Vaccine Risk Perception
subjects exposed to informaNo Argument
Arguments
tion polarized along cultural
Hierarchs
2.43
3.03**
lines relative to ones who
Egalitarians
2.19
2.63**
were not. Even in the “no
2.37
2.95*
argument” condition, indi- Individualists
Communitarians
2.25
2.67*
vidualists and hierarchs n ≈ 250 per condition. Risk perception is risk vs. benefit measured on a fourrated the potential risks of point scale. * denotes differences between differences in differences of means
the policy as being slightly of opposing groups across conditions significant at p ≤ .10, ** significant at p
higher, and the potential ≤ .05.
benefits lower, than did
communitarians and egalitarians. But in the “argument” condition, these disparities in riskbenefit perceptions were significantly more pronounced.
Culture and Credibility
Next we conducted an experiment to see whether the perceived cultural values of argument
advocates would make a difference. We started by creating four culturally identifiable “policy
experts”: individuals who, based on their pictures and mock CVs, were perceived by pretest subjects as holding one or another of the worldviews featured in the cultural cognition theory. We
then asked 800 completely new subjects to indicate what they thought about the risks and benefits of the HPV vaccine after reading the balanced arguments, which were now randomly assigned to debating pairs of culturally identifiable experts.
We found that policy advocates’ perceived cultural worldviews can indeed significantly accentuate or mute cultural polarization. Where an egalitarian advocate defended mandatory vaccination and a hierarchal advocate opposed it (“expected alignment” condition), the gulf between
egalitarian and hierarchical subjects widened. The same was true of the gap between communitarians and individualists when advocates sharing their identities took the pro- and con- positions, respectively.
But when the advocate-argument alignments were reversed—that is when a hierarchal or an
individualist expert defended mandatory vaccination against an egalitarian or communitarian expert who opposed it (“unexpected alignment” condition)—polarization shrunk. Indeed, individu-

Second National Risk and Culture Study

Page 12

alists and communitarians in this “unexpected alignment” condition actually swapped places:
now communitarians displayed greater concern for the risks of the HPV-vaccination policy (although the difference between the two groups’ was small and not statistically significant in that
condition; in effect, polarization along this dimension had disappeared). Clearly, the cultural
identity of advocates is an inCulturally Identifiable Advocates
credibly powerful mechanism—
Hierarchist
one that rivals the power that predispositions have on information
processing—in the cultural cognition of risk.
The inversion of the alignment between advocate identity
Communitarian
and arguments need not be this Individualist
complete in order to counter polarization. We found that polarization was also small (relative to
that in the “argument” and “expected alignment” conditions)
among subjects in what we called
the “voucher” condition. Each
Egalitarian
subject in that condition had observed a debate among advocates who both shared that subject’s worldview. Accordingly, only
one of the two debating experts in this condition was taking a position contrary to the stance normally associated with his (and the subject’s) perceived values.
The diminishment of polarization in this condition is an important finding. People in the real
world won’t encounter many examples of debates in which there is a radical inversion of the cultural identities of advocates and the cultural resonances of the arguments they are making. But
they might well see examples of advocates whose values they share taking unexpected positions
in debates with others of their own persuasion. The conservative Governor of Texas, for example, surprised many of his ideological peers when he came out in favor of mandatory HPV vaccinations (Elliott 2007). When individuals see that even some persons who hold their values are
willing to take such a position—to “vouch” for that position as acceptable for someone with their
values to hold—they are less likely to form the subconscious impression that taking such a view
will estrange them from their peers. In that state, they are more likely to consider the merits of an
argument that runs contrary to their cultural predispositions.
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HPV Vaccine Risk Perception

Risk > Benefits

2.00

Hierarchists
Egalitarians
3.03

3.11
2.99
2.97
2.73
2.71

2.63

2.62

2.43
2.19
Benefits > Risk
No
Argument

Degree of Polarization Across Conditions

Difference in Mean Risk Perception

Cultural Risk Perceptions Across Conditions

0.00

Argument

Hierarchists more
concerned than
Egalitarians
0.40

0.28
0.24

0.23

No difference
No
Argument

Expected Unexpected Voucher
Alignment Aligment

Argument

2.67

3.02

2.95

2.94

2.86

2.8

2.69

2.37

2.25
Benefits > Risk
No
Argument

Difference in Mean Risk Perception

HPV Vaccine Risk Perception
2.00

Individualist
Communitarians
2.95

Expected Unexpected Voucher
Alignment Aligment

Experiment Condition

Experiment Condition
Risk > Benefits

0.49

Individualists more
concerned than
communitarians

0.34
0.28

0.14
0.12

No difference

Risks =

-0.09

-0.25

Argument

Expected Unexpected Voucher
Alignment Aligment

Experiment Condition

No
Argument

Argument

Expected Unexpected Voucher
Alignment Aligment

Experiment Condition
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5. Terrorism and National Security
How large the risk of domestic terrorism is—and how effective restrictions of domestic civil
liberties, foreign wars, and other policies aimed at abating it are—dominate contemporary American politics. On these questions, too, Americans are culturally divided.
Hierarchs and egalitarians are both concerned about terrorism, but have radically different
beliefs about where the risk of it comes from and what to do about it. Egalitarians, we found, believe that the war in Iraq has increased the risk of terrorist attack. Hierarchs reject that claim.
They supported increasing the number of troops sent to Iraq at the time President Bush’s “surge”
policy was being implemented, while egalitarians strongly opposed that policy.
“The war in Iraq has increased the
risk of a terrorist attack in the
United States.”

Response

g
g
(% of Relevant
Decile)

100%

80%

13

22

21

78

79

29

35

41

49

55

56

70

“Do you support or oppose the
plan to send more troops to Iraq?”
%
Disagree
Agree

92

89

86

82

75

71

65

58

45

35

87

Oppose
Support

%
71
65

60%

65

%

59

55

51
45

40%

44

%

42
35

30

20%

0%

29
25

%

more
. egalitarian
. . .

<------->
.
. more
. hierarchic
.

%

8

11

14

18

more
. egalitarian
. . .

<------->
.
. more
. hierarchic
.

Cultural Worldview: Population Deciles
(each bar 10% of U.S. Population)

Individualists aren’t inclined to share the beliefs of hierarchs on terrorism. Their parting of
the ways on this issue fits the logic of their respective worldviews: believing that terrorism is a
serious risk is congenial to investing governmental authorities with significant power, a prospect
that affirms hierarchical sensibilities but that threatens individualist ones. Indeed, individualism
inclines persons to oppose, hierarchy to support, reintroducing the draft and the warantless wiretapping of the telephone communications of U.S. citizens suspected of communicating with terrorists (see regression table in the next section).
6. Culture, Ideology, and Mass Political Opinion
The late political scientist Aaron Wildavsky posited that that cultural outlooks of the sort
featured in the cultural cognition theory are the font of political preferences generally. He therefore advocated the use of a two-dimensional, hierarchy-egalitarianism/individualismcommunitarianism framework rather than a one dimensional, liberal-conservative one for explaining political attitudes and behavior (Wildavsky1987).
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The Second National Risk and Culture Study generated evidence strongly supportive of
Wildavsky’s view. On a host of issues—from raising the minimum wage to repealing the estate
tax; from the provision of universal health care to the imposition of the death penalty; from regulating the possession of firearms at home to increasing the number of U.S. troops in Iraq—
cultural worldviews explained differences in individuals’ opinions more powerfully than did liberal-conservative ideology.
Explanatory Power of Liberal-Conservative Ideology and Cultural Worldviews, Overall
and at “Low” Level of Political Knowledge
Conservative vs. Liberal
Individualism vs. Communitarianism
Hierarchy vs. Egalitarianism

Gun Control
Overall
Low Knowledge
-.063*** -.017
-.186*** -.151***
-.156*** -.175***

Capital Punishment
Overall
Low Knowledge
.023
-.011
.103*** .137***
.180*** .121***

Conservative vs. Liberal
Individualism vs. Communitarianism
Hierarchy vs. Egalitarianism

Warrantless Wiretap
Overall
Low Knowledge
.036
-.051
-.063*** -.022
.192*** .077*

Universal Health
Overall
Low Knowledge
-.095*** -.024
-.111*** -.012
-.175*** -.197***

Conservative vs. Liberal
Individualism vs. Communitarianism
Hierarchy vs. Egalitarianism

Raising Min. Wage
Overall
Low Knowledge
-.079
-.028
-.099*** .061
-.170*** -.152***

Repeal Estate Tax
Overall
Low Knowledge
.033
-.009
.147*** .111***
.066*** -.011

Reintroduce Draft
Iraq Surge
Overall
Low Knowledge
Overall
Low Knowledge
Conservative vs. Liberal
.029
.037
.071*** .037
Individualism vs. Communitarianism
-.057**
-.038
.004
-.002
Hierarchy vs. Egalitarianism
.101*** .115***
.185*** .165***
N ≈ 1,450. *** p ≤ .01, ** p ≤ .05, * p ≤ .10. Dependent variables is support for indicated policy. Coefficients are semi-partial correlations in multivariate regression controlling for gender, race, income, education,
and political party affiliation.

Even more importantly, data from the Second National Risk and Culture Study furnish support for Wildavsky’s conjectures on the role of culture in orienting mass opinion. It is a staple of
conventional public opinion research that conventional measures of ideology, such as liberalismconservativism, lack the power to explain the opinion of most members of the public, who presumably lack the time and aptitude to deduce policy positions from abstract principles. Wildavsky hypothesized that such persons are guided instead by cultural cues—primarily the meanings policies express, and the positions espoused by culturally like-minded peers. Consistent with
Wildavsky’s position, the National Risk and Culture Study found that on a host of issues cultural
orientations, but not political ideologies, explain the views of persons of low levels of political
sophistication.
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Conclusion
There is a culture war in America, but it is about facts, not values. There is very little evidence that most Americans care nearly as much about issues that symbolize competing cultural
values as they do about the economy, national security, and the safety and health of themselves
and their loved ones. There is ample evidence, however, that Americans are sharply divided
along cultural lines about what sorts of conditions endanger these interests and what sorts of policies effectively counteract such risks.
Findings from the Second National Culture and Risk Study help to show why. Psychologically speaking, it’s much easier to believe that conduct one finds dishonorable or offensive is
dangerous, and conduct one finds noble or admirable is socially beneficial, than vice versa. People are also much more inclined to accept information about risk and danger when it comes from
someone who shares their values than when it comes from someone who holds opposing commitments.
Researchers associated with the Cultural Cognition Project believe that cultural polarization
arising from these types of influences is unfortunate. Most Americans believe the goal of law is
to secure society’s collective well-being, not to declare winners and losers among persons who
subscribe to different cultural outlooks. Nevertheless, because of the decisive influence of their
worldviews on their risk perceptions, such people end up drawn into divisive forms of cultural
conflict nevertheless as they deliberate about what sorts of polices will best promote their common ends.
The Second National Risk and Culture Study identifies conditions that help to ameliorate
this state of affairs. When policies are framed in ways that affirm rather than threaten citizens’
cultural values, people are less likely to dismiss information that runs contrary to their prior beliefs. They are also more willing to weigh and reflect on such information in an environment in
which they can see that others who share their values find that information credible.
These findings can be used to structure risk communication and policymaking. The goal
wouldn’t be to move people toward one set of beliefs or another on a disputed issue (such as gun
control, or global warming, or mandatory HPV vaccination). Rather it would be to neutralize the
tendency of people to polarize along cultural lines as they consider information. Disagreements
about facts would no doubt persist, but they would no longer take the form of battles between
rival cultural factions.
Much work remains to be done, however, to formulate risk-communication and policymaking strategies of this sort. Armed with increased knowledge about how values shape beliefs about
risk, researchers should now energetically apply themselves to identifying deliberative process
that make it possible to fashion regulatory policies that are both consistent with sound scientific
data and congenial to persons of diverse cultural outlooks.
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Appendix A. Study Sample and Methods
Study subjects consisted of a nationally representative general population sample of approximately 5,000 Americans. Initially, the cultural values of all subjects were measured using
two
scales
corresponding
to
“Hierarchy-Egalitarianism”
and
“IndividualismCommunitarianism,” respectively (Kahan et al. 2007a). Individuals drawn from the resulting
“subject pool” were thereafter used as subjects for particular surveys and experiments, which
were conducted at various points between late December 2006 and early September 2007.
Subjects participated in these surveys and experiments through the on-line testing facilities of Knowledge Networks (http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/). Knowledge Networks is a
public opinion research firm with offices located throughout the United States. It maintains an
active respondent pool of some 40,000 persons who are recruited to participate in on-line surveys
and experiments administered on behalf of academic and governmental researchers and private
businesses. Knowledge Network respondents agree to participate in three to four surveys per
month in exchange for Internet access and other forms of compensation. It uses recruitment and
sampling methods that assure a diverse sample that is demographically representative of the U.S.
population. Numerous studies have found that on-line testing of Knowledge Network samples
generates results equivalent in their reliability conventional live testing methods, including random-digit-dial surveys (http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/2005aapor.html). Studies using Knowledge Networks facilities are routinely published in peer-reviewed academic journals
(http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/docs/List%20of%20Journals%208-28-2006.pdf).
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